Expressivism and normative realism
Most of my work so far has been in metaethics. I have argued that normative realism, i.e. the view that there are objective normative facts and many of our beliefs about these facts are true, is compatible with expressivism about normative discourse, i.e. the view that the primary function of normative terms is to convey our emotions and attitudes in ways that influence other people and promote social cooperation. More precisely, I believe expressivism is compatible with naturalist realism about normativity, that is, the view that normative properties are natural properties. (I call the resulting view “quasi-naturalism”.) I have also argued that quasi-naturalism can successfully address important metasemantic and epistemological challenges to realism, and I continue to explore the virtues of this metaethical view.
The ethics of imperfection
This project aims to make sense of the various ways in which we are attached to, or find meaning in, imperfect and even bad things in our lives. For instance, how can we reasonably affirm our actual lives when comparing them to better lives we could have had? How can we make peace with our past moral failings while committing to avoid similar mistakes in the future? What is it to love people for who they are, and how can this be justified? How can we find meaning in experiences of adversity, hardship, or loss, and what does this tell us about the relation between meaning in life and value? Can value-neutral and even pessimistic narratives about the world make our lives more meaningful?
Publications
Epistemological challenges to normative realism: a soft naturalist response, forthcoming in C. Brîncuș (ed.), From an Analytical Point of View: Essays in Honor of Mircea Dumitru
Normative reference as a normative question, Erkenntnis, 2023 [pre-print]
Quasi-naturalism and the problem of alternative normative concepts, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2022 [pre-print]
Representation, deflationism, and the question of realism, Ergo, 2021
Is there a good moral argument against moral realism?, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2021
Making peace with moral imperfection, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2019
Reid on moral sentimentalism, Res Philosophica, 2019 [pre-print]
Personal value, biographical identity, and retrospective attitudes, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2019 [pre-print]
Review of Robert N. Johnson and Michael Smith (eds.), Passions and Projections. Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2018 [pre-print]
Expressivism and the reliability challenge, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2017 [pre-print]
Expressivism and realist explanations, Philosophical Studies, 2017 [pre-print]
Papers under review or in progress
A paper on the relation between meaning in life and value
A paper on grief as a crisis of meaning
A paper on love as a practice
A paper on finding meaning in the ordinary